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Prior to 1986, it was not possible under the Federal Food Drug and Cos-
metics Act to export drugs which did not have FDA approval. The law was
changed by the Drug Export Amendments Act of 1986 after nearly a decade of
debate.1 Those who favored liberalizing the drug export law argued that Amer-
ican companies were at a competitive disadvantage in foreign markets because
of the prohibitions, and the pharmaceutical industry suered as a result. They
argued that the national sovereignty of those countries that decided that un-
approved drugs were appropriate for use by their citizens should be respected,
and that it would be excessively paternalistic to deny these countries the prod-
ucts they desired. Those who opposed lifting the ban on exporting unapproved
drugs argued that economic concerns were not sucient to overcome the ethical
diculty in creating a double standard which allowed drugs that had not been
determined safe and eective for use by U.S. citizens to be used by the citizens
of foreign nations.
The Drug Export Amendments Act of 1986 is a compromise that
allows export of FDA unapproved drugs to twenty-one countries that have been
judged by Congress to have a drug regulatory system suciently robust for the
protection of their citizens. The act contains safeguards for preventing the re-
export of unapproved drugs to countries that are not well equipped to protect
1. The Ethics and Economics of Unapproved New Drug Export, 21 Geo. Wash. J.
Int'l L. & Econ. 315, 333 (1987).
1their citizens, and safeguards for the prevention of other unethical and abusive
export practices. It is now possible to re-examine the policy choices made in
the legislation with the benet of some years of experience operating under the
new rules. There is evidence to support the conclusion that American rms
have benetted signicantly from the export reforms, although the gains have
been modest in some respects. Further streamlining of the process can provide
additional gain with little, if any, added health risks.
Concerns that the citizens of foreign countries face health risks
from the importation on unapproved drugs still exist. The prohibitions against
exporting unapproved drugs to those countries that have an unsophisticated
regulatory system provide little actual protection to the citizens of those coun-
tries, and a more eective policy would allow American companies to export
certain unapproved drugs to those countries under FDA supervision.
The Drug Export Amendments Act of 1986
The 1986 Amendments became section 802 of the Federal Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act. It divided unapproved drug and biological products
into three categories, each with a dierent set of requirements for export.
The primary category included unapproved new drugs and biolog-
ical products. Products in this category can be exported to any of twenty-one
foreign countries listed in the Amendments. These twenty-one countries are de-
veloped nations that have regulatory systems sophisticated enough to respon-
sibly manage the distribution and use of unapproved drugs. The Amendments
require that; (1) the product is approved for marketing in the receiving country;
2(2) an application for FDA approval for the product in the U.S. has not been
denied; (3) the product is the subject of an investigational new drug exemption
(IND), and approval for the product in the U.S. is being actively pursued; (4)
the product is manufactured in conformity with good manufacturing practices
(GMP), and is not adulterated; (5) the shipping label lists the countries for
which the product is authorized for export; (6) the export of the product is not
contrary to the public health and safety of the U.S.; and (7) the four export re-
quirements for all drug exports have been met. Importing countries are required
to agree in writing not to export the drug to an unlisted country.
Export of unapproved drugs to unlisted countries is prohibited un-
less the Secretary of Health and Human Services determines that the drug is
safe and eective for the treatment of a particular disease in that country. That
determination must be based on credible scientic evidence including clinical
investigation. Thus the safety precaution for a new drug to enter an unlisted
country is higher, since in a listed country the unapproved drug has to be the
subject of an investigational new drug exemption which may be obtained before
clinical testing has begun.
The second category covers tropical disease drugs. These drugs
are not required to be approved in the receiving country. Nor is it required
that the drug is under active investigation in the U.S.. The export of tropical
disease drugs is not restricted to the twenty-one statutorily listed countries.
These products may be shipped to any country that the FDA determines there
is credible scientic evidence, including clinical investigations that the drug is
3safe and eective for its intended use. This category exists to promote the
development of drugs for the treatment of diseases which are not common in
the U.S., and therefore would normally not be the subject of investigation in
the U.S..
The third category covers partially processed biological products.
The 1986 Amendments amends The Public Health Service Act to allow the
FDA to approve export of a partially processed biological product which is not
in a form applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of disease, and which
requires further manufacture into a nal dosage form in the receiving country.
These products can only be exported to one of the twenty-one listed company,
however there is no restriction against trans-shipment. The nal product to be
developed from the partially processed biological product must be approved in
the receiving country, or the FDA must be satised that such approval is being
sought. This category was included to give biotechnology rms the exibility
to export biological intermediates, which are regulated as nal products by
the FDA, under less restrictive regulation. The privilege is comparable to the
exible that pharmaceutical companies have to export chemical intermediates
under less restriction conditions than those applied to nished drug products.
Common to all three categories are requirements for good manu-
facturing practices and that the product be labeled with the countries that it
has been approved for export.
The Pharmaceutical Industry
The pharmaceutical industry lobbied hard for lifting the ban on the
4export of unapproved drugs. Four characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry
causes it to particularly sensitive to regulation in this area.' First, the industry
has a lack of concentration. The majority of the market is shared by more
than a dozen rms, and a number of smaller rms participate in the market.
Second pharmaceutical companies spend a large amount of their resources in the
research and development of new products. The development of a new products
is a long and expensive process, and any delay can signicantly eect the health
of the company. Third, the pharmaceutical industry is extensively regulated.
Fourth, drug companies depend on the international market for a signicant
portion of their revenue.
Prior to the 1986 amendments, U.S. drug companies were prevented
from marketing abroad any drug that did not have FDA approval. The result
was that American rms were typically late to enter foreign markets with new
drug products because of the long period required for a new drug to receive FDA
approval. Those in favor of lifting the ban asserted that the competitiveness of
the American pharmaceutical industry was being seriously harmed.
In order to circumvent FDA restrictions, larger rms, who could af-
ford to, transferred production of their products abroad. Transfer of production
facilities abroad suppressed the growth of the domestic pharmaceutical industry,
further reducing the competitiveness of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. The
lose of domestic jobs was claimed to be considerable, and production abroad
denied the U.S. the benet of export income.
Those rms that were not large enough to open facilities abroad
5by necessity entered into licensing and partnership arrangements with foreign
companies. This prevented small U.S. companies from proting fully from the
development of innovative products. This was presented as a major burden on
the development of innovative products.
Biotechnology rms are particularly sensitive to regulatory delays
in the approval of their products. They are typically small, research oriented
rms supported by venture capital. New technologies such as recombient DNA
research require expensive state-of-the-art equipment and long development
times. Biotechnology rms are pressed to generate income as soon as possible.
These rms are usually nancially incapable of establishing separate facilities
abroad to circumvent FDA regulation, and frequently enter into foreign joint
ventures and licensing agreements, or transfer proprietary technology abroad.
Those who argued for lifting the ban on exporting unapproved products argued
that the ban was causing the U.S. to literally give away its lead in biotechnology.
Those who favored keeping the export ban in place claimed that the
primary reason for the movement of research and development, and production
facilities abroad were due to factors such as foreign laws that required domes-
tic research prior to domestic marketing, favorable costs of labor and facilities
abroad, and the ability to enter otherwise inaccessible markets through foreign
partnerships.
The Drug Export Amendments Act In Practice
An empirical study was done examining the export applications
led and processed during a ve year period following the enactment of the
61986 Amendments.2 The export review phase, which is the time from the date of
export application to the date of export approval was calculated for all products
approved for export during the study period. The market jump, which is the
time from the date of export approval to the date of U.S. marketing approval,
was also calculated. The market jump is the maximum amount of additional
time available to a drug producer to sell his product in a foreign market upon
export approval.
The average export review phase for the primary category of new
drug products was 3.6 months. The time it took to approve a product for export
varied from about one month to about twenty o ve months. The average market
jump was about one and one ohalf years of potential foreign market access prior
to a product's approval in the U.S.. The increased potential marketing time
for products approved domestically during the study period ranged up to about
forty oseven months.
Over the study period there were no applications for export ap-
proval for category two products, tropical drugs. For partially processed biolog-
ical products, the average export review phase was 6.4 months, about twice as
long as those products in the rst category.
Assuming that drug producers have been able to take advantage of
the additional potential foreign market access, the study shows that the 1986
Amendments have produced measurable gain for U.S. drug producers. One
area of disappointment is that the reforms so far have had a minimal eect in
2. Sheila R. Schuman, Michael Manocchia, Mark Seibring, The Drug Export
Amendments Act of 1986: Is It All It Was Intended To Be?, 49 Food & Drug L. J. 367
(1994).
7stimulating the development of tropical drugs. Also, the breakdown of products
for which export applications were led show that a relatively small number
were for biotechnological therapeutic drugs. Apparently the 1986 Amendments
have not been as benecial to biotechnology companies as hoped.
The benet to pharmaceutical companies under the 1986 Amend-
ments could be increased if the review period for export applications were de-
creased, thereby increasing the market jump. Currently, the review period typi-
cally runs well over the statutorily indicated thirty day period. The Pharmaceu-
tical Manufacturers Association (PMA) produced a white paper which contained
suggestions for reducing the review period.3 The PMA identied dierences in
the way in which dierent FDA reviewing divisions processed applications as
responsible for some of the delay. The PMA suggests that a standard export
application form would alleviate the problem. Also, delay would be eliminated
by allowing the applicant for export to provide the
FDA with proof that the drug product has been approved for use in
the receiving country, rather than requiring that the proof be provided directly
by the importing government. These two suggestions are reasonable, and ought
to be adopted by the FDA.
Although it seems clear that pharmaceutical companies enjoy the
benet of increased foreign market access under the 1986 Amendments, it is not
as clear whether the promise of growth in the domestic pharmaceutical indus-
tries and the accompanying increase in domestic jobs has been fullled. The
3. Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n, Drug Export Amendments Act of 1986: Proposed
Administrative Modications.
8number of domestic jobs within the pharmaceutical industry, and the number
of pharmaceutical companies increased approximately threefold over the period
from 1987 to l992,4 however, it is uncertain what portion of this growth can
be attributed to the export reform, since over that period the industry ben-
eted from a number of nancial, tax, and business assistance initiatives and
incentives meant to encourage growth in the industry.
U.S. Responsibility For Unapproved Drugs Abroad
The 1986 Amendments addressed three conicting policy concerns.
The challenge was for the United States to promote the growth of its domestic
pharmaceutical industry without compromising its moral responsibility to re-
gard the health and safety of citizens of foreign countries as highly as it regards
the health and safety of U.S. citizens, while at the same time respecting the
sovereign right of foreign nations to make their own decisions.
By allowing American pharmaceutical companies to export their
unapproved drugs to twenty-one developed nations, the 1986 Amendments im-
proves the U.S. trade balance, creates short oterm prots for the pharmaceutical
industry, and potentially produces long-term growth and innovation in the in-
dustry. In addition the amendments may bring a halt to large pharmaceutical
companies building plants abroad in order to circumvent the U.S. regulatory
system. Do the 1986 Amendments satisfy the ethical and sovereignty policy
goals as well as they satisfy the domestic economic concerns?
Those who opposed lifting the ban on the exportation of unap-
4. Sheila R. Schuman, Michael Manocchia, Mark Seibring, The Drug Export
Amendments Act of 1986: Is It All It Was Intended To Be?, 49 Food & Drug L. J. 367,
384 (1994).
9proved drugs for ethical reasons believed that a drug not considered safe and
eective for U.S. consumers should not be sold to foreign consumers either. It
did not matter that these same drugs were readily available from other sources.
Even if the drugs were available from other sources, that did not justify the
United States also providing them. They argued that the creation of a dou-
ble standard which implied that drugs that aren't good enough for us are good
enough for you diminished the United States moral standing in the international
community.
Supporters of lifting the ban answered that this did not create a
double standard, but rather armed each nation's right to set its own standards.
Aside from purely abstract principles of national sovereignty, there were sound
reasons for allowing nations to make their own health regulatory decisions. For
one, the FDA's drug approval process is not always rational. It is subject
to American political pressures which are inapplicable to foreign nations and
should not be imposed on other nations.
Second, permitting nations to set their own health standards, rec-
ognizes that dierent countries may have dierent health needs, depending on
such factors as climate, race, geography, life expectancy, and disease patterns.
Other countries may evaluate the safety and eectiveness of a drug using a
dierent, yet completely valid, set of social priorities and dierent risk benet
calculations than those appropriate for the U.S.. A popular example of such a
drug is Depo oProvera, which is an injected contraceptive banned in the United
States because of the possibility that it promotes cancer. In countries where life
10expectancy is short and mortality during pregnancy and childbirth is high, the
possibility of developing cancer at age sixty-ve from use of drug would be of
relatively less concern.
Given the sound reasons why one nation's view of a drug may dier
form that of the United States's, it was strongly asserted that imposing U.S.
drug standards on other countries was unnecessary and oensive paternalistic
interference with the sovereign right of a nation to establish its own health
standards.
Neither side of this debate won a complete victory in the 1986
Amendments. The policy adopted is one that attempts to address the valid
concerns of both sides.
The 1986 Amendments implicitly divides the world into two classes
of countries. In the rst class are those countries with a health regulatory system
sophisticated enough that the United States can allow them to make their own
regulatory decisions without incurring moral blame for their errors. These are
the twenty-one statutorily listed countries; the nations listed roughly correspond
to what would be considered the world's developed nations. The second class of
unlisted countries is comprised of those countries which lack the sophisticated
regulatory processes and resources necessary to make their own health and safety
decisions, and which therefore must rely on the FDA'S regulatory processes to
protect them from importing drugs which may prove to be injurious.
This approach, although it addresses the moral and ethical concerns
of the United States, is less satisfying in its approach to the sovereignty of foreign
11nations. Only a limited number of countries, exactly twenty-one, are allowed
to exercise sovereignty in regards to which drugs they wish to import from the
United States.
However, a more serious problem with the two class system imple-
mented by the 1986 amendments is that it fails to protect unlisted nations from
the unsupervised distribution of risky drugs if unapproved drugs are re oexported
from a listed country to an unlisted country. The export amendments do pro-
vide safeguards against re oexport. Importing countries must agree in writing
not to re oexport unapproved drugs to unlisted companies. Exporting rms are
responsible for insuring that unapproved drugs are exported only in a quantity
that could reasonably be used by the receiving country. However, as a practi-
cal matter, it is nearly impossible to prevent the trans-shipment of unapproved
drugs to unlisted countries.
Since trans-shipment of unapproved drugs can not be prevented,
the two class system breaks down, and the result is that unlisted countries which
have been judged to be ill-equipped to manage the risk of unapproved drugs,
receive them from listed countries with no FDA oversight at all. The FDA has
no power to determine whether trans-shipped drugs have become adulterated or
misbranded, or have been prepared according to good manufacturing standards.
The current law, because of the inability to prevent trans oshipment of drugs,
permits the sale of unapproved drugs anywhere in the world, while exercising
oversight only over those
I drugs sold to listed countries, which by denition, are least in
12need of FDA regulatory oversight.
Rather than returning to a complete ban, the United states could
address the diculties listed above by lifting the ban completely. The U.S. would
allow all foreign governments to exercise their responsibility over the health and
safety of their citizens. The FDA would then directly oversee the quality and
manufacturing of all American drugs exported to foreign countries.
However, the United States would still be faced with the dilemma
that numerous countries which are potentially recipients of risky products are
ill-equipped to make the necessary riskbenef it analysis and develop appropriate
drug regulation. In order to best meet its moral responsibility to insure that
these countries are not harmed by American products, the U.S. would have
to be provide importing governments with full information about the products
and assistance in making the necessary riskbenef it analysis and developing and
implementing appropriate controls.
However, it is not feasible for the FDA, which already has its hands
full with the regulation of the U.S. market, to take on the additional responsi-
bility of assisting other countries with their drug regulation. The United States
should therefore maintain the distinction between countries that have sophisti-
cated drug regulatory processes, and those which do not. However, once a drug
with FDA approval has been approved for use by one of the listed countries,
opening the way for exports of the drug abroad, all countries, including unlisted
ones should be permitted to import the drug from the United States. This
policy concedes that the U.S. can not adequately prevent the transshipment
13of U.S. drugs, and takes the pragmatic approach that it is better for unlisted
countries to acquire the drugs from the United States, where the FDA can exer-
cise oversight of quality control, labeling, and promotion of the drug. Although
this variation of the present policy does little to increase the competency of
the supervision of drug products in unlisted countries, it does have the benet
of insuring that those drug products that do enter the country are as safe as
possible under the circumstances.
The FDA should further require that exporting rms provide notice
to receiving countries if FDA takes any action to ban or restrict the domestic
use and distribution of a drug.
Conclusion
The current export law for drugs which have not received FDA
approval is a fair attempt to simultaneously satisfy three contradictory policy
concerns. The present law adequately promotes the growth of the U.S. phar-
maceutical industry, although more benet under the law can be obtained by
modifying the application process to reduce the review period for export appli-
cations.
The current law, as it reads, favors protecting underdeveloped
countries from risky drugs over concerns for respecting principles of national
sovereignty. However, in practice the safeguards which appear in the law can
not be adequately enforced. While on the books, it appears that the United
States has adequately addressed its moral and ethical obligations, the reality
is somewhat dierent. Therefore, the United States should permit direct ex-
14portation of unapproved drugs to unlisted countries once that drug becomes
available to a foreign market. Although this policy would expose the U.S. to
wider criticism that its export policy unethically provides risky drugs to vul-
nerable nations, it would be a signicant step toward expanding the protection
that those nations actually receive.
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